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Abstract. Most existing market maker mechanisms for prediction mar-
kets are designed for events with a nite number of outcomes. All known
attempts on designing market makers for forecasting continuous-outcome
events resulted in mechanisms with undesirable properties. In this pa-
per, we take an axiomatic approach to study whether it is possible for
continuous-outcome market makers to satisfy certain desirable properties
simultaneously. We dene a general class of continuous-outcome market
makers, which allows traders to express their information on any continu-
ous subspace of their choice. We characterize desirable properties of these
market makers using formal axioms. Our main result is an impossibility
theorem showing that if a market maker oers binary-payo contracts,
either the market maker has unbounded worst case loss or the contract
prices will stop being responsive, making future trades no longer prof-
itable. In addition, we analyze a mechanism that does not belong to our
framework. This mechanism has a worst case loss linear in the number of
submitted orders, but encourages some undesirable strategic behavior.
Key words: Prediction markets; continuous-outcome events; combina-
torial prediction markets; expressive betting.
1 Introduction
A ubiquitous need in organizations and societies is to obtain and aggregate dis-
persed information of uncertain events so that informed decisions can be made.
Prediction markets have been designed for this goal of information aggregation
and have been shown to provide remarkably accurate forecasts in practice [1{6].
A prediction market is a betting intermediary that oers contracts whose pay-
os are tied to outcomes of future events. Participants reveal their information
about the event through buying and selling contracts. To facilitate information
aggregation, many automated market maker mechanisms [7{12] have been de-
signed to ensure that a participant can always conduct trades with the market
maker and reveal his information whenever he nds it protable.
? This work is supported by NSF under Grant No. CCF-0953516. Gao is partially
supported by a NSERC PGS-D Scholarship.Many events of interests, from carbon dioxide emission level to hurricane
landing location, are naturally perceived as continuous random variables with
continuous outcome spaces. However, most existing market makers, including
the popular logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR) [7,8] and the dynamic
parimutuel markets (DPM) [9,13], are designed for nite-outcome random vari-
ables, and cannot handle continuous outcome spaces directly. For forecasting
continuous-outcome events, these mechanisms rely on discretizing the contin-
uous outcome space into a nite number of subsets and treat the event as a
nite-outcome random variable. This approach poses the signicant challenge
of determining the level of discretization to be used in advance. Choosing too
coarse-grained discretization could hurt information aggregation, since market
participants may not be able to easily express their information with the pre-
specied subsets. If the chosen discretization is too ne-grained, certain market
makers like LMSR may suer from a large worst case loss. In general, commit-
ting to an inappropriate discretization in advance may create unnecessary psy-
chological burden for traders. In practice, Crowdcast1, Yoopick [14], and Gates
Hillman [15] prediction markets allow traders to wager on intervals through their
user-friendly interfaces, although the underlying mechanisms still use some sort
of discretization. Therefore, for predicting events that are naturally perceived
as continuous, it is desirable to design market mechanisms that can handle the
continuous-outcome spaces directly and provide sucient expressiveness for par-
ticipants to easily reveal their information on the continuous-outcome spaces.
Gao, Chen and Pennock [16] proposed the continuous-outcome LMSR and
DPM. Although these continuous-outcome mechanisms oer considerable exi-
bility for participants to reveal their information, they suer from some undesir-
able properties. In particular, the continuous-outcome LMSR can potentially lose
an innite amount of money, whereas the nite-outcome LMSR is guaranteed
to have bounded worst case loss. The continuous DPM suers from a dierent
problem { even if a trader bets on a subspace that contains the realized outcome,
he can potentially incur a loss. The intellectual quest that motivates this paper
is to understand which set of desirable properties are possible or impossible to
satisfy simultaneously for continuous-outcome market makers.
In this paper, we take an axiomatic approach to analyzing market makers for
continuous-outcome events. We rst dene cost functional based market mak-
ers for continuous-outcome events. Then, we characterize desirable properties of
these market makers as formal axioms. Our main contribution is an impossibil-
ity result showing that no market maker of this class can satisfy these axioms
simultaneously. Specically, for a market maker oering binary-payo contracts,
it either has unbounded worst-case loss or the contract prices will become un-
responsive to trades being conducted. We also analyze a mechanism which does
not t into our axiomatic framework. This mechanism has a worst case loss linear
in the number of orders, but encourages some undesirable strategic behavior.
Related Work. There have been a signicant amount of eorts on designing
and analyzing market maker mechanisms for nite-outcome events, including
1 http://www.crowdcast.commarket scoring rules [7,8], dynamic parimutuel markets [9], cost function based
market makers [10,17], and sequential convex parimutuel mechanisms [12]. The
focus has been on analyzing the various properties of the market makers and
establishing connections among them. In the context of designing combinatorial
prediction markets, research has been focusing on the computational tractability
of pricing expressive bets in the nite-outcome LMSR [18,19]. The work of Gao,
Chen, and Pennock [16] is the closest to this paper. It generalized LMSR and
DPM to handle continuous outcome spaces and analyzed the properties of the
resulting mechanisms.
2 Background
In this section, we rst describe a class of cost function based market makers for
nite-outcome events. We then introduce and the discuss the properties of the
continuous-outcome LMSR market maker.
For nite-outcome events, Chen and Pennock [10] introduced a general class
of automated market maker mechanisms, called the cost function based market
makers. It has been shown that this class of market makers is equivalent to most
of the known nite-outcome market makers under mild conditions [10,12,17]2.
A cost function based market maker oers N contracts, each corresponding to
one of N mutually exclusive and exhaustive outcomes of an event. Each contract
pays o $1 if and only if the corresponding outcome occurs. The market maker
uses a dierentiable cost function C(q) : RN ! R to capture the total amount of
money wagered in the market, where the vector q represents the number of shares
purchased by all traders. If a trader changes the quantity vector from q to q 0, he
pays C(q0) C(q) to the market maker and acquires q0  q shares of contracts.
The instantaneous price of the i-th contract, dened as pi(q) = @C(q)=@qi,
represents the price per share of an innitesimal number of shares.
Chen and Vaughan [17] formalized that a cost function is valid if the instan-
taneous prices pi(q) are non-negative and form a probability distribution over
the outcome space. They proved that the sucient and necessary conditions for
a cost function C to be valid are: dierentiability (to ensure that prices are well-
dened), increasing monotonicity (to ensure that prices are non-negative), and
a translation invariance condition C(q + k1) = C(q) + k; 8q;k (to ensure that
prices sum to 1 and there is no arbitrage).
It has been shown that many valid market makers based on convex cost
functions have bounded worst case loss [12,17]3, where the loss of the market
maker is seen as a subsidy to promote information aggregation. For instance,
the popular LMSR mechanism has bounded worst-case loss given by blogN.
For continuous-outcome events, Gao, Chen and Pennock [16] generalized the
nite-outcome LMSR for the interval betting setting. Even though the result-
2 DPM is an exception to this.
3 This is because a valid convex cost function based market maker is equivalent to a
strictly proper market scoring rule under mild conditions. Any market scoring rule
with a regular proper scoring rule has bounded worst case loss.ing continuous-outcome LMSR can handle interval bets for continuous-outcome
events, it suers from unbounded loss { the market maker could potentially lose
an innite amount of money to the traders.
3 An Axiomatic Framework
In this section, we will dene a general class of automated market maker mech-
anisms for continuous-outcome events, the cost functional based market mak-
ers. These market makers generalize the cost function based market makers for
nite-outcome events to handle continuous-outcome spaces. We then propose
three axioms to characterize desirable properties for these market makers.
3.1 Cost functional based market makers for continuous-outcome
events
Consider a continuous random variable X with domain (L;U) = fx : x 2 R;L 
x  U;L 2 R [ f 1g;U 2 R [ f+1gg. Let x 2 (L;U) represent a particular
outcome and let x denote the realized outcome in hindsight. We dene a class
of cost functional based market makers for predicting the realized value of X.
Cost functional based market makers are operated based on trading shares
of contracts. First, we dene the quantity function q(x) 2 L1(L;U), representing
the number of shares purchased for outcome x 2 (L;U), which is analogous to
the quantity vector q in the nite-outcome case4. The value q(x) can be thought
as the total number of shares purchased for contracts that will pay o when x
is the realized outcome.
A cost functional based market maker uses a dierentiable cost functional,
C[q(x)] : L1(L;U) ! R, to capture the total amount of money wagered in
the market as a functional of the current quantity function q(x). If a trader
changes the quantity function from q(x) to q0(x), he obtains q0(x)   q(x) shares
for each outcome x and must pay C[q0(x)]   C[q(x)] to the market maker. We
use p[q(x);q0(x)] to denote the cost of such a transaction, i.e. p[q(x);q0(x)] =
C[q0(x)] C[q(x)]. The market maker starts the market with some initial quantity
function q0(x) such that the value of C[q0(x)] is nite.
For any q(x), the price density functional p[q(x)] is dened as the func-
tional derivative of the cost functional with respect to q(x), that is, p[q(x)] =
C[q(x)]=q(x). The functional p[q(x)] maps the quantity function to a proba-
bility density function over (L;U). It is analogous to pi(q) in the nite-outcome
setting. According to the calculus of functionals, we can express the cost of a
transaction in terms of an integral of the price density functional, that is
p[q(x);q0(x)] = C[q0(x)]   C[q(x)] (1)
=
Z 1
0
Z U
L
p[q(x) + k(q0(x)   q(x))](q0(x)   q(x))dxdk
4 L
1(L;U) denotes the space of Lebesgue integrable functions on (L;U) with norm
kq(x)k =
R U
L jq(x)jdx.If a trader changes the quantity function from q(x) to q0(x), then the future
payo of this transaction o[q(x);q0(x);x] is a nonzero real number if q0(x) 6=
q(x) (i.e. the trader is buying or selling winning contracts), and $0 otherwise
where x is the realized outcome. Negative payo encodes loss from selling
the winning contracts. Other than this, we put no restriction on the value of
o[q(x);q0(x);x] and leave the denition of this value to specic mechanisms.
In our framework, a cost functional is valid if and only if the corresponding
market maker satises two simple conditions:
1. For every x 2 (L;U), and every q(x) 2 L1(L;U), p[q(x)]  0.
2. For every q(x) 2 L1(L;U),
R U
L p[q(x)]dx = 1.
These are the minimum requirements for the price density functional to represent
a valid probability distribution over the outcome space. The following theorem
gives the sucient and necessary conditions for the cost functional to be valid.
Theorem 1. A cost functional C is valid if and only if it satises the following
properties:
1. Dierentiability: The functional derivative C[q(x)]=q(x) exists for all q(x) 2
L1(L;U) and all x 2 (L;U).
2. Increasing Monotonicity: For any q(x);q0(x) 2 L1(L;U), if q0(x)  q(x);8x 2
(L;U), then C[q0(x)]  C[q(x)].
3. Positive Translation Invariance: For any q(x) 2 L1(L;U) and any constant
k, C[q(x) + k] = C[q(x)] + k.
The above concepts dene a general class of market maker mechanisms for
forecasting continuous-outcome events5. These market makers can potentially
support many dierent betting languages. In this paper, we focus on the sim-
ple and intuitive interval betting language [16]. For interval betting, traders
are restricted to purchasing a constant s shares of a contract on an interval
(a;b)  (L;U) of their choice, where a < b. Such a transaction increases q(x) by
s for every x 2 (a;b). We denote the quantity function after the transaction by
q0(x) = fq(x)+sg(a;b) where q0(x) is dened by q0(x) = q(x)+s;8x 2 (a;b) and
q0(x) = q(x);8x 2 (L;U)n(a;b). For such a transaction, we dene the instanta-
neous contract price p(a;b)[q(x)] to be the integral of the price density functional
over (a;b), that is, p(a;b)[q(x)] =
R b
a p[q(x)]dx; This is intuitively the price per
share for buying an innitesimal share of (a;b). Note that we still do not put
explicit restrictions on the transaction payo for an interval contract (a;b), i.e.
o[q(x);q0(x);x] where q0(x) = fq(x) + sg(a;b).
In the rest of the paper, we only consider cost functional based market makers
for interval betting. Below we dene an Interval Cost Continuity condition for
interval betting market makers.
5 We note that the continuous-outcome DPM is not a valid market maker in our
framework because its price density function does not correspond to a probability
distribution.Denition 2 (Interval Cost Continuity). A cost functional C[q(x)] satises
the Interval Cost Continuity condition if for any x 2 (L;U), q(x) 2 L1(L;U),
s 2 R, and q0(x) = fq(x) + sg(x ;x+), C[q0(x)] is right continuous at  = 0
and continuous for all  > 0.
The Interval Cost Continuity property species that, for each interval bet,
the cost functional value for the nal quantity function must be continuous for
any change  in the size of the betting interval. As  approaches 0 (i.e. the size
of the interval approaches 0), C[q0(x)] approaches to C[q(x)].
3.2 Desirable properties
We propose three formal axioms to characterize some desirable properties of the
cost functional based market makers for continuous-outcome events. We only
consider interval bets.
Axiom 1 (Responsive Price) If q(x) and q0(x) satisfy three conditions: (1)
q0(x) = q(x);8x 2 (L;U)n(a;b), (2) q0(x)  q(x);8x 2 (a;b), and (3) 9(c;d) 
(a;b) s.t. q0(x) > q(x);8x 2 (c;d), then
p(a;b)[q0(x)] > p(a;b)[q(x)]
for any contract (a;b)  (L;U).
The Responsive Price axiom species that the instantaneous contract price
is strictly monotonically increasing as the quantity over one of its subintervals
strictly increases. This axiom is desirable since it guarantees that the change in
the instantaneous contract prices will always respond to trades conducted and
traders are always able to conduct trades irrespective of the current prices.
Axiom 2 (Domain Consistency) The payo and cost of purchasing shares
of (L;U) are always equal, that is, for all q(x), q0(x) = fq(x) + sg(L;U), and
x 2 (L;U), we have o[q(x);q0(x);x] = p[q(x);q0(x)].
Intuitively, any bet on the entire domain (L;U) should earn zero prot as
the bet is not revealing any useful information about X. This axiom is required
for a cost functional based market maker to be arbitrage free. For instance,
the continuous-outcome LMSR satises this axiom. Moreover, we will show in
the next section that this axiom is a sucient and necessary condition for the
contracts oered to be exclusively binary-payo contracts.
Axiom 3 (Bounded Loss) There exists B 2 R, such that, for any sequence of
n transactions where the quantity functions satisfy qi(x) = fqi 1(x) + sig(ai;bi)
and (ai;bi)  (L;U), we have
max
x2(L;U)
 
n X
i=1
(o[qi(x);qi+1(x);x]   p[qi(x);qi+1(x)])
!
 B:This axiom gives a sucient and necessary condition for the market maker to
have bounded worst case loss. The market maker's loss is the dierence between
the total money he pays out and the total money he collects. The worst outcome
for the market maker is when this dierence is maximized.
4 Impossibility Result
In this section, we present our main impossibility theorem. We rst prove con-
ditions for a valid market maker mechanism to oer exclusively binary-payo
contracts. For these market makers, we prove in Theorem 5 that the Responsive
Price and Bounded Loss axioms cannot be satised simultaneously.
Lemma 3 (Binary Contract Lemma). A valid market maker mechanism
satises the Domain Consistency axiom if and only if it oers binary-payo
interval contracts, that is, the future payo of any contract is xed to be $1 per
share if the realized outcome x falls within the interval and $0 otherwise.
Lemma 3 shows that if a valid market maker satises the Domain Consistency
axiom, the payo of the contract has to be binary regardless of the interval
chosen. We also note that with binary-payo contracts, the Responsive Price
axiom implies that the price of any contract never reaches 0 or 1. Next, we
present Lemma 4 to facilitate the proof of our main impossibility result.
Lemma 4 (Responsive Price Lemma). For a valid market maker satisfying
the Interval Cost Continuity condition, if it satises the Responsive Price axiom,
then for any winning contract (a;b), any number of shares s 2 Z+, any quantity
function q(x), and any  > 0, there exists a winning contract (a0;b0)  (a;b),
such that
C[q00(x)]   C[q(x)]  (C[q0(x)]   C[q(x)])
where q0(x) = fq(x) + sg(a;b) and q00(x) = fq(x) + sg(a0;b0).
Based on Lemma 4, if an interval (a;b) is a winning contract, there exists a
subinterval of (a;b) which is also winning such that the cost of buying a constant
number of shares over the subinterval is an arbitrarily small fraction of the cost
of buying the same number of shares over (a;b).
Theorem 5 (Impossibility Result). For a valid market maker satisfying the
Interval Cost Continuity condition, if it allows traders to bet on intervals of any
nonzero size and satises the Domain Consistency axiom, then it cannot satisfy
the Responsive Price and Bounded Loss axioms simultaneously.
Proof Sketch. By Lemma 3, the contracts oered must pay o $1 per share if
they are winning, and $0 otherwise. Consider a trader who knows x and has a
xed budget of $m. Using the following procedure, this trader could potentially
get an arbitrarily large prot.
To get $s payo, the trader can start by calculating the cost of buying s
shares of an arbitrary winning contract (a;b), denoted by T. If T  m, then byLemma 4, the trader can choose  = m
T and nd a winning contract (a0;b0) 
(a;b) such that the cost of buying s shares over (a0;b0) is no more than m
T  T =
m dollars and the corresponding prot is at least s   m dollars. Because s is
arbitrary, the trader's prot, hence the market maker's loss, is not bounded. u t
Even though Theorem 5 allows traders to bet on intervals of any nonzero size,
we now show that even if we restrict the size of the smallest betting interval to be
at least z > 0, with certain assumptions, the trader could still bet on arbitrarily
small intervals of their choice.
Corollary 6. For a valid market maker satisfying the Interval Cost Continuity
condition and restricting the size of the smallest betting interval to be z 2 R
where 0 < z < (U  L)=2 6, if it satises the Domain Consistency axiom, then it
cannot simultaneously satisfy the Responsive Price and Bounded Loss axioms.
The key insight for proving the above corollary is that a trader can perform a
sequence of transactions which is equivalent to purchasing shares of an arbitrarily
small interval even with the restriction on the size of the smallest betting interval.
It is worth noting that these transactions can be potentially completed in any
order, and multiple traders can collude to complete them. Thus, it would be very
challenging in general to detect such trading patterns in practice.
The unbounded worst case loss of the continuous-outcome LMSR is a special
case of our impossibility result. However, compared with nite-outcome market
makers, this impossibility result is rather surprising since the nite-outcome
LMSR essentially satises the nite-outcome versions of all three axioms.
We could possibly relax the Responsive Price axiom to derive mechanisms
with bounded worst case loss, although the resulting market maker may be trivial
and less interesting. For example, a market maker can quickly increase the price
of contracts to 1 once the quantity for the contracts increases beyond a certain
value. Beyond this point, purchasing more shares will not earn the trader any
more prot and bounded worst case loss can be achieved.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
While the class of market makers we considered is quite general, there exist other
continuous-outcome mechanisms outside of this class that can achieve bounded
worst case loss and responsive price simultaneously. In particular, we can operate
the nite-outcome LMSR over the continuous-outcome space by discretizing the
outcome space on the y given the submitted orders. By violating our denition
of instantaneous contract price and the Interval Cost Continuity condition, this
mechanism achieves the worst case loss linear in the number of orders submitted,
but also encourages certain undesirable strategic behaviors.
To operate the nite-outcome LMSR over a continuous-outcome space, we
split the existing intervals in the state space for every submitted order on (c;d)
6 This assumption is reasonable since the size of the smallest betting interval should
be much smaller than the size of the domain of the random variable.whenever c or d falls within the existing intervals. Then the order is traded via
LMSR with the state space after splitting. For every splitting of this kind, the
outstanding quantities and instantaneous prices need to satisfy the following
consistency constraints for the mechanism to remain arbitrage free.
 The sum of the instantaneous prices of the subintervals must be equal to the
instantaneous price of the original interval.
 The number of shares of each subinterval held by all traders must be equal
to the number of shares of the original interval held by all traders.
The rst consistency constraint allows considerable freedom in splitting the prob-
ability estimates among the subintervals. If the probability estimates are split
equally among the subintervals, then the resulting mechanism violates our deni-
tion of instantaneous contract price and the Interval Cost Continuity condition.
However, this market maker has worst case loss given by M log3, where M is
the number of orders submitted. However, this mechanism does not provide the
incentive for traders to reveal their information truthfully. Given several subin-
tervals with equal prices, a trader could maximize his probability of winning by
betting on the largest interval regardless of his subject probability estimates for
these intervals.
If the market maker splits the probability estimates in proportion to the
lengths of the subintervals, it satises all the axioms proposed and the worst case
loss becomes unbounded according to Theorem 5. Intuitively, the unbounded loss
is due to the market maker assigning arbitrarily small initial probability to the
smallest interval containing the realized outcome. If the traders drive the price
of this interval to be $1, then the market maker is destined to lose an innite
amount of money to the traders.
In conclusion, we take an axiomatic approach to study automated market
maker mechanisms for forecasting continuous-outcome events. In our axiomatic
framework, we consider a general class of cost functional based market makers
and dene formal axioms to characterize desirable properties of these mecha-
nisms. We then prove that it is impossible for a valid cost functional based
market maker mechanism to satisfy a certain set of properties simultaneously.
Our results suggest that future eorts on designing continuous-outcome market
makers should focus on nding the right tradeos among the desirable proper-
ties. In particular, it may be fruitful to investigate whether a market maker can
be designed such that the Interval Cost Continuity condition or the Responsive
Price axiom is relaxed to a reasonable degree so that other desirable properties
can be achieved for practical applications.
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